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Abstract
The class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover
(compromise stable games) is characterized. Moreover an easy explicit
formula for the nucleolus for this class of games is developed, using an
approach based on bankruptcy problems. Also, the class of convex and
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core cover and the Weber set is studied and it is proved that under a
weak condition their intersection is nonempty.
Keywords: Core cover, core, Weber set, nucleolus, bankruptcy games,
clan games.
JEL Classification Number: C71.
1Corresponding author. Email: Quant@uvt.nl
2Department of Econometrics & OR and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153,
5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
The authors wish to thank Jos Potters and Henk Norde for their helpful comments.
1
1 Introduction
An important issue in cooperative game theory is the allocation of the value
of the grand coalition of a game to the players of this game. To this aim
various solution concepts have been developed. They can be categorized in
one point solution concepts, e.g. the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)), the
nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the compromise value (Tijs (1981)), and
set-valued solutions concepts, e.g. the core (Gillies (1953)), the core cover
(Tijs and Lipperts (1982)) and the Weber set (Weber (1988)). The core is
contained in the Weber set and the core cover. Furthermore, the nucleolus
is an element of the core. It is established that a game is convex (Shapley
(1971), Ichiishi (1981)) if and only if the Weber set coincides with the core.
In this paper the class of games for which the core coincides with the
core cover (compromise stable games) is characterized. This class contains
the class of bankruptcy games (Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs (1988)) and clan
games (Potters, Poos, Muto, and Tijs (1989)). Moreover an easy explicit
formula for the nucleolus for this class of games is developed, using an ap-
proach based on bankruptcy problems. As an application an easy proof
of the formula for the nucleolus of clan games as derived by Potters et al.
(1989) is provided. Furthermore the class of convex and compromise stable
games is characterized. Finally, the relation between the core cover and
the Weber set is studied. It is proved that under a weak condition their
intersection is nonempty.
In section 2 we summarize some main known facts on the core cover.
Section 3 deals with the characterization of the class of compromise stable
games. Section 4 derives an explicit formula for the nucleolus for compromise
stable games and discusses an application to clan games. The final section
studies the relation between the core cover and the Weber set.
2 Core cover
This section reviews some general notions dealing with the core cover of
transferable utility games. A transferable utility game (TU-game) consists
of a pair (N, v), in which N is a finite set of players and v : 2N → R is
a function assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2N a payoff v(S). By definition
v(∅) = 0. The set of all transferable utility games with player set N is
denoted by TUN .
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The core C(v) of a game v ∈ TUN is given by:
C(v) =
{






xi ≥ v(S), ∀S ∈ 2N\{∅}
}
.
The core of a game consists of those payoff vectors such that no coalition
has an incentive to split off. The core of a game might be empty.
The utopia vector M(v) of v ∈ TUN consists of the utopia demands
of all players. The utopia demand of player i ∈ N is given by:
Mi(v) = v(N)− v(N\{i}).
The minimum right mi(v) of player i corresponds to the minimum value
this player can achieve by satisfying all other players in a coalition by giving










The core cover CC(v) consists of all efficient payoff vectors, giving each
player at least his minimum right, but no more than his utopia demand:
CC(v) =
{
x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), m(v) ≤ x ≤ M(v)
}
.
The elements of the core cover can be interpreted as possible allocations
of the value of the grand coalition and can be seen as compromise values
between m(v) and M(v). Note that the core cover of a game can be empty.
A game v ∈ TUN is said to be compromise admissible if:
m(v) ≤ M(v) and
∑
i∈N




Clearly the core cover of v is non-empty if and only if v is compromise
admissible. The class of all compromise admissible games with player set N
is denoted by CAN . The following result about the core and the core cover
is well known:
Proposition 2.1 (Tijs and Lipperts (1982)) Let v ∈ TUN , then C(v) ⊂
CC(v).
The extreme points of the core cover can be described by larginal vectors.
The concept of larginals is also used in González Dı́az, Borm, Hendrickx,
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and Quant (2003) and in Quant, Borm, Hendrickx, and Zwikker (2004). The
first paper uses larginal vectors to give an alternative characterization of
the compromise value. The latter paper studies the average of all larginals
as a one point solution concept. An order of N is a bijective function
σ : {1, . . . , |N |} → N . The player at position k in the order σ is denoted
by σ(k). The set of all orders of N is denoted by Π(N). For σ ∈ Π(N) the
larginal lσ(v) is the efficient payoff vector giving the first players in σ their
utopia demands as long as it is still possible to satisfy the remaining players
with at least their minimum rights.



























for every k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}.
It is easily seen that the core cover equals the convex hull of all larginals:
CC(v) = conv
{
lσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)}.
The first player with respect to σ who does not receive his utopia payoff
is called the pivot of lσ(v). In case every player gets his utopia payoff, we
define the pivot to be the last player. Note that each larginal vector contains
exactly one pivot. The following example illustrates the notion of larginal
vectors and pivots.
Example 2.1 Let v ∈ CAN be the game defined by:
S 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
v(S) 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 7 4 6 8 10
Then M(v) = (2, 4, 6, 3) and m(v) = (1, 0, 1, 0), so v ∈ CAN . For σ =
(1234), lσ(v) equals (2, 4, 4, 0) and player 3 is the pivot. If σ = (3421), the
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corresponding larginal equals lσ(v) = (1, 0, 6, 3) and player 2 is the pivot.
The core cover of v is described by:
CC(v) = conv
{
lσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)}
= conv
{
(2, 4, 4, 0), (2, 4, 1, 3), (2, 2, 6, 0), (2, 0, 6, 2), (2, 0, 5, 3),
(1, 4, 5, 0), (1, 4, 2, 3), (1, 0, 6, 3), (1, 3, 6, 0)
}
.
3 Core and core cover
In this section we characterize the class of compromise stable games, i.e. the
class of games for which the core cover coincides with the core. Furthermore
we characterize the class of convex compromise stable games.
We are interested in the class of compromise stable games. For example
bankruptcy games and clan games (the precise definitions are provided later
on) are compromise stable games.
Definition 3.1 A game v ∈ CAN is compromise stable if C(v) = CC(v).
The following theorem characterizes the class of compromise stable games.
Theorem 3.1 Let v ∈ CAN . Then v is compromise stable if and only if










Proof: Let v ∈ CAN . First suppose that C(v) = CC(v). Then for all
σ ∈ Π(N), lσ(v) ∈ C(v). Let S ∈ 2N\{∅}. We show that (1) is satisfied.
Let σ ∈ Π(N) begin with all players of N\S and end with the players of S.
Hence for k ∈ {1, . . . , |N\S|}, σ(k) ∈ N\S. Let lσ(v) be the larginal vector
corresponding to σ. There are two possibilities:
• The pivot of lσ(v) is an element of N\S. In this case each player of S








• The pivot of lσ(v) is an element of S. This implies that each player in




lσi (v) = v(N)−
∑
i∈N\S















Conversely, assume that inequality (1) is satisfied for each S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
By convexity of the core it suffices to show that for each order σ ∈ Π(N),





















The core condition concerning coalition S is satisfied. Hence, lσ(v) is an
element of C(v). ¤
A game v ∈ TUN is convex if for all i ∈ N and all S ⊂ T ⊂ N\{i}:
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ).
For convex games the marginal contribution of a player increases if this
player joins a larger coalition. If v ∈ TUN is convex, it is easily verified that
mi(v) = v({i}) for all i ∈ N .
In the following we focus on games which are both convex and compro-
mise stable. A well-known class of games satisfying both convexity and com-
promise stability is the class of bankruptcy games (O’Neill (1982)). These
games arise from so-called bankruptcy situations. Bankruptcy situations
are formalized by a pair (E, d). Here E ≥ 0 is the estate which has to be
divided among the claimants in N and d ∈ RN , d ≥ 0 is a vector of claims.
By the nature of a bankruptcy problem E ≤ ∑i∈N di.
One can associate a bankruptcy game vE,d ∈ TUN to a bankruptcy
problem (E, d). The value of a coalition S is determined by the amount of









A game v ∈ TUN is additive if there exists a vector a ∈ RN such that
v(S) =
∑
i∈S ai for all S ∈ 2N . The game v is then denoted by a. A game
v ∈ TUN is strategically equivalent to w ∈ TUN if there exist a positive
real number k and an additive game a ∈ TUN such that w = a + kv.
The next theorem states that bankruptcy games are essentially the only
games that are both convex and compromise stable.
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Theorem 3.2 A game v ∈ TUN is both convex and compromise stable if
and only if v is strategically equivalent to a bankruptcy game.
Proof: Let v ∈ TUN be a convex compromise stable game. Define
ai = v({i}) = mi(v) (the last equality is satisfied because v is convex) and
w(S) = v(S) − ∑i∈S ai for all S ∈ 2N . Then w ∈ TUN is convex and
compromise stable. Furthermore mi(w) = w({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N and
C(w) = CC(w). Furthermore:
M(w) = M(v)−m(v) and m(w) = 0.
We show that w is the bankruptcy game vE,d with E = w(N) and d = M(w).

















Theorem 3.1 implies w(S) ≤ vE,d(S) for all S ⊂ N . Now suppose there is
a coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that w(S) < vE,d(S). Because w is convex,
w(S) ≥ ∑i∈S w({i}) =
∑
i∈S mi(w) and hence:







Consider σ ∈ Π(N) that begins with the players of S and ends with the
players of N\S, i.e. σ(k) ∈ S for k ∈ {1, . . . , |S|}. The payoff of coalition
N\S according to the marginal vector mσ(w) is given by:
∑
j∈N\S




This implies that mσ(w) 6∈ CC(w). This contradicts CC(w) = C(w).
The converse is also true because bankruptcy games are convex games
and the core of a bankruptcy game coincides with the core cover (cf. Curiel
et al. (1988)). ¤
It is trivial to show that for any 3-player TU-game the core cover equals
the core. From Theorem 3.2 it then follows that each convex three player
game is strategically equivalent to a bankruptcy game.
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4 The nucleolus of compromise stable games
This section analyzes the nucleolus of compromise stable games: it develops
a formula which is based on the Talmud rule for bankruptcy problems.
Let (E, d) be a bankruptcy problem. The constrained equal award
rule (CEA) is for all i ∈ N defined by
CEAi(E, d) = min{α, di},
with α such that
∑
i∈N min{α, di} = E. The Talmud rule (TAL) (cf.

















for all i ∈ N . Aumann and Maschler (1985) prove that the Talmud rule
equals the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler (1969)) of the corresponding bankruptcy
game. The nucleolus of a game1 v ∈ TUN is denoted by ν(v). For our
results we do not need the exact definition of the nucleolus, but we only use
the following important result.
Theorem 4.1 (Potters and Tijs (1994)) Let v, w ∈ TUN be such that
v is convex and C(v) = C(w). Then ν(v) = ν(w).
The following theorem shows that the nucleolus for compromise stable games
can be computed by first giving every player his minimum right and then
adding the value of the Talmud rule of a bankruptcy problem derived from
the corresponding game.
Theorem 4.2 Let v ∈ CAN be compromise stable. Then








Proof: Let v ∈ CAN be compromise stable. Define the additive game
a ∈ TUN by taking ai = mi(v) for all i ∈ N , and define w ∈ TUN as
w(S) = v(S)−∑i∈S ai, S ∈ 2N . Because the nucleolus is relative invariant
with respect to strategic equivalence we have
ν(v) = a + ν(w) = m(v) + ν(w).
1In fact, the game should have a non-empty imputation set.
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For w the following assertions can easily be verified M(w) = M(v)−m(v),
m(w) = 0, w(N) = v(N)−∑i∈N mi(v), and C(w) = CC(w).
Consider the bankruptcy problem defined by E = w(N) and d = M(w).
For the corresponding bankruptcy game vE,d it is true that vE,d(N) = w(N).
By definition of vE,d, Mi(vE,d) = min{E, di}, and using the convexity of vE,d,

















The last equality follows from the fact that mi(w) = 0, and mi(w) ≥ w(N)−∑




x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
















x ∈ RN |
∑
i∈N
xi = w(N), 0 ≤ x ≤ M(w)
}
= CC(w) = C(w).
Since vE,d and w have the same core, and vE,d is convex, we can apply
Theorem 4.1. Hence,

















ν(v) = m(v) + ν(w)








Corollary 4.1 Let v be a 3-player game with a non-empty core. Then









Example 4.1 Consider the game of Example 2.1. Then M(v) = (2, 4, 6, 3)
and m(v) = (1, 0, 1, 0). For every coalition S inequality (1) is valid. For
example v({1, 2}) ≤ m1(v) + m2(v) and v({2, 3}) ≤ v(N)−M1(v)−M4(v).
Applying Theorem 3.1 we find C(v) = CC(v). Using Theorem 4.2, the
nucleolus of v is given by:







= (1, 0, 1, 0) + TAL
(
8, (1, 4, 5, 3)
)
= (1, 0, 1, 0) + (1, 4, 5, 3)− CEA(5, (12 , 2, 212 , 112)
)
= (2, 4, 6, 3)− (12 , 112 , 112 , 112) = (112 , 212 , 412 , 112).
We now consider the application of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.2 with
respect to clan games. In a clan game a coalition can not make any profit
if a certain group (CLAN) is not part of this coalition. A game v ∈ TUN is
a clan game if v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ 2N , Mi(v) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and if there
exists a nonempty coalition CLAN ⊂ N such that:
(i) v(S) = 0 if CLAN 6⊂ S
(ii) v(N)− v(S) ≥ ∑i∈N\S Mi(v), for all S with CLAN ⊂ S.
The last property is also known as the union property. Clan games for which
CLAN = {i∗} are also known as big boss games.2 In the following corollary
several (known) properties of clan games are easily proved with the aid of
Theorems 3.1 and 4.2.
Corollary 4.2 (cf. Potters et al. (1989)) Let v ∈ TUN be a clan game






Proof: Let v ∈ TUN be a clan game, with |CLAN| ≥ 2. Then Mi(v) = v(N)
if i ∈ CLAN. Let i ∈ N and S ⊂ N such that i ∈ S. If CLAN ⊂ S it can








2This definition differs from the definition of big boss games given in Muto et al. (1988)
in the sense that it is now required that v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ 2N and the requirement of
monotonicity is weakened to M(v) ≥ 0. A game v ∈ TUN is monotonic, if v(S) ≤ v(T ) if
S ⊂ T .
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The last inequality follows from M(v) ≥ 0. Since v(S) = 0 if CLAN 6⊂ S, it
follows that (by taking S = {i}) mi(v) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Therefore m(v) ≤
M(v). Because v(N) ≥ 0 and M(v) ≥ 0 it is true that ∑i∈N mi(v) ≤
v(N) ≤ ∑i∈N Mi(v). Hence v ∈ CAN .
Let S ∈ 2N\{∅}. If CLAN ⊂ S, then (1) is satisfied by condition (ii). If
CLAN 6⊂ S, then v(S) = 0 and formula (1) follows from m(v) = 0. Theorem
3.1 yields C(v) = CC(v). Since |CLAN | ≥ 2, we have that ∑i∈N Mi(v) ≥







Note that the results of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.2 can also be used to
reprove the following corollary in a relatively straightforward way.
Corollary 4.3 (cf. Muto et al. (1988)) Let v ∈ TUN be a clan game
with CLAN = {i∗}. Then v ∈ CAN , C(v) = CC(v), and
νj(v) =
{ 1
2Mj(v) if j ∈ N\{i∗}
v(N)− 12
∑
k∈N\{i∗}Mk(v) if j = i
∗.
The following Venn diagram summarizes the relations between the dif-






Figure 1: A Venn diagram depicting the relations between several classes of
games (up to strategic equivalence).
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5 Core cover and Weber set
This section studies the relation between the core cover and the Weber set.
For σ ∈ Π(N) the corresponding marginal vector mσ(v) measures the
marginal contribution of the players with respect to σ, i.e.
mσσ(i)(v) = v
({σ(1), . . . , σ(i)})− v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i− 1)}), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The Weber set is the convex hull of all marginal vectors:
W (v) = conv{mσ(v) | σ ∈ Π(N)}.
An important relation between core and Weber set is given in the following
proposition:
Proposition 5.1 (Weber (1988)) Let v ∈ TUN . Then C(v) ⊂ W (v).
Moreover,
Proposition 5.2 (Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981)) Let v ∈ TUN .
Then v is convex if and only if C(v) = W (v).
For any TU-game the intersection of the core cover and the Weber set always
contains the core. Hence, the core cover and the Weber set have points in
common if the core is non-empty. This raises the question whether the
intersection of the core cover and the Weber set is non-empty in general for
compromise admissible games. It is showed that under a weak condition the
answer is affirmative. For the proof of this theorem the following lemma is
needed:
Lemma 5.1 If n ∈ N and d, y ∈ Rn with:
y1 ≥ . . . ≥ yn, (3)
k∑
i=1




di = 0, (5)
then,





Proof: The proof is given by an induction argument to n. For n = 1
the assertion is true, since d1 = 0. Assume that the lemma is satisfied for











diyi + (dn−1 + dn)yn−1) + dn(yn − yn−1)
≤ 0 + dn(yn − yn−1) ≤ 0.
The first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the second
inequality follows from the fact that dn ≥ 0 and yn − yn−1 ≤ 0. ¤




mj(v) ≤ v(N). (6)
Then CC(v) ∩W (v) 6= ∅.
Proof: Let v ∈ CAN be such that for all S ∈ 2N (6) is satisfied. Suppose
that CC(v)∩W (v) = ∅. Since CC(v) and W (v) are both closed and convex
sets we can separate these sets with a hyperplane. This means that there
exists a vector y ∈ RN such that:
m · y > l · y for all m ∈ W (v), l ∈ CC(v). (7)
Let σ ∈ Π(N) an order such that yσ(1) ≥ yσ(2) ≥ . . . ≥ yσ(n). Consider lσ(v)
and mσ(v). Then:








Now we first derive some inequalities with respect to v(S). Because v is
compromise admissible and hence m(v) ≤ M(v), it is true that for all i ∈ N












= mi(v) ≤ Mi(v).
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Define dσ(k) = mσσ(k)(v) − lσσ(k)(v) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}. Then for all























σ(k) = v(N) −
∑|N |
k=r+1 mσ(k)(v). Furthermore∑|N |










Hence mσ(v) · y ≤ lσ(v) · y. This contradicts (7). ¤
The following example shows that it is possible that the core cover and the
Weber set do not have any points in common.
Example 5.1 Let v ∈ TUN and N = {1, . . . , 5}. Let v be such that the
players 1, 2 and 3 are symmetric and so are players 4 and 5. To simplify
notations we say that the players 1, 2 and 3 are of type a and 4 and 5 of type
b. For example the coalition {abb} represents the coalitions {145}, {245} or
{345}. The game v is given by:
S a b aa ab bb aaa aab abb aaab aabb N
v(S) 0 0 −1 0 2 −1 −1 2 −1 1 1
14
It is easily verified that M(v) = (0, 0, 0, 2, 2) and m(v) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0). Hence
the core cover of v is given by:
CC(v) =
{
x ∈ RN | x ≥ 0, x4 + x5 = 1, x1 = x2 = x3 = 0
}
.
Because of symmetry, one does not need to calculate all marginal vec-
tors to compute the Weber set. There are only six marginal vectors each
corresponding to twenty different orders. The Weber set is given by:
W (v) = conv
{
(−1, 0, 0, 2, 0), (−1, 0, 0, 0, 2), (0,−1, 0, 2, 0),
(0,−1, 0, 0, 2), (0, 0,−1, 2, 0), (0, 0,−1, 0, 2)}.




3 = −1 for all σ ∈ Π(N). Hence m1 + m2 +
m3 = −1 for all m ∈ W (v), and therefore CC(v) ∩W (v) = ∅.
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